This paper studies how directors'reputational concerns a¤ect board structure, corporate governance, and …rm value. In our setting, directors a¤ect their …rms'governance, and governance, in turn, a¤ects …rms' demand for new directors. Whether the labor market rewards a shareholder-friendly or management-friendly reputation is determined in equilibrium and depends on aggregate governance. We show that directors'desire to be invited to other boards creates strategic complementarity of corporate governance across …rms. Directors' reputational concerns amplify the governance system: strong systems become stronger and weak systems become weaker. We derive implications for multiple directorships, board size, transparency, and board independence.
Introduction
Why do corporate boards look the way they are? Are boards structured optimally to maximize shareholder value, and how do board regulations a¤ect their composition? To a large extent, the structure of corporate boards is governed by the labor market for directors. On the demand side, …rms decide which directors to invite based on directors'reputation and on the preferences of those controlling the nomination process. On the supply side, directors seek to develop their reputation in order to gain more board seats and thereby obtain prestige, power, compensation, and access to valuable networks. Thus, directors'reputation plays an important role, a¤ecting both directors'actions and the structure of corporate boards.
A number of recent institutional and regulatory changes to the director selection process have a¤ected the labor market for directors and the value of reputation. Examples include a shift from plurality to majority voting, proxy access proposals, restrictions on the number of directorships, and increased boardroom transparency. These rules and practices also vary substantially across countries. However, the e¤ect of these factors is not well understood, and some of the recent changes are highly debated. 1 This paper sheds light on these issues by developing a theory of the labor market for directors and studying how directors'reputational concerns a¤ect board structure, directors'behavior, and ultimately shareholder value.
Our key observation is that directors care about two con ‡icting types of reputation, and which type of reputation is rewarded more in the labor market depends on the aggregate quality of corporate governance. If governance is strong and boards of other …rms protect the interests of their shareholders, then building a reputation for being shareholder-friendly can help in obtaining more directorships. Conversely, if governance is weak and boards of other …rms are captured by their managers, who want to maintain power, then having a management-friendly reputation can be more useful in getting additional board seats. The empirical evidence is consistent with the importance of both types of reputation. Some papers, such as Coles and Hoi (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) , …nd that directors who demonstrate shareholderfriendly behavior and monitor the management are more likely to gain additional directorships.
Others, such as Helland (2006) and Marshall (2011) , …nd that shareholder-friendly actions actually hurt directors'chances of being invited to other boards. Moreover, Zajac and Westphal (1996) , Eminet and Guedri (2010) , and Bouwman (2011) …nd evidence that is directly consistent with the existence of con ‡icting reputational concerns: …rms controlled by shareholders (managers) are more likely to invite directors who have demonstrated shareholder-friendliness (management-friendliness) in their previous board positions. 2 To study how these con ‡icting reputational concerns a¤ect directors' behavior and …rm value, we develop a model with three key components. First, being a board member allows a director to a¤ect corporate governance in his …rm and thereby change the allocation of control between management and shareholders. Second, whether a director is shareholder-friendly or management-friendly is the director's private information, and by allocating control to either managers or shareholders, directors can a¤ect the market's perception of their shareholderfriendliness. Third, the allocation of control in a given …rm determines, among other things, which type of directors it is looking for. In particular, …rms that are controlled by shareholders (management) have a demand for shareholder-friendly (management-friendly) directors. Therefore, the aggregate quality of corporate governance, the structure of boards, and the type of reputation that is more valuable in the labor market, are all determined in equilibrium.
We show that directors'reputational concerns lead to strategic complementarity of corporate governance across …rms. In particular, stronger governance in one …rm leads to stronger governance in its peer …rms, and vice versa. 3 Intuitively, when most other …rms have weak corporate governance, the decision of whom to invite to the boards of these …rms is controlled by managers. Thus, to increase their chances of obtaining additional directorships, directors have incentives to build a reputation for being management-friendly. This type of reputation can be established by giving more control to the managers of their …rms and not interfering with their decisions, leading to weaker governance. Conversely, when most other …rms have strong corporate governance, directors will strengthen corporate governance of their …rms to build a reputation for being shareholder-friendly.
Our paper thus identi…es a novel channel of strategic complementarities between …rms, which works through directors'reputational concerns in the labor market. Strategic complementarities arise due to the dual role that directors'actions have on the supply and demand in the market for directors: in addition to a¤ecting directors'own reputation (supply), they also a¤ect which type of reputation is more valuable in the market (demand). 4 Strategic complementarity of governance has two implications. First, due to strategic complementarity, a small regulatory change, such as a marginal increase in the required percentage of independent directors, can have a very signi…cant e¤ect on the aggregate quality of governance. Second, strategic complementarity implies that there can be multiple equilibria, characterized by the aggregate quality of corporate governance. In particular, we show that when directors'reputational concerns are su¢ ciently important, an equilibrium in which aggregate governance is strong and the labor market rewards directors for being shareholder-friendly co-exists with a weak governance equilibrium, in which a management-friendly reputation is more valuable. In this respect, the strength of corporate governance is self-ful…lling, and hence, countries and industries with similar characteristics can have very di¤erent governance systems.
Our analysis demonstrates that the e¤ect of various corporate governance polices crucially 4 The existing literature on labor markets points out other channels of strategic complementarities between …rms: strategic complementarities can arise when both workers and …rms make their investment or entry decisions and there are search frictions (e.g., Acemoglu (1996) , Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995) ), or when there are increasing returns to scale in either the matching technology (e.g., Diamond (1982) ) or the production function (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer (1994) ).
depends on the existing aggregate quality of corporate governance. Consider a policy that strengthens directors'reputational concerns, such as increasing the maximum allowed number of directorships a single individual can hold. 5 We show that when directors become more concerned about their reputation in the labor market, governance becomes even stronger in systems with strong governance, where a shareholder-friendly reputation is more valuable.
However, in systems where managers are in control and directors are rewarded more for being management-friendly, stronger reputational concerns weaken governance even further. In other words, directors' reputational concerns amplify the existing aggregate quality of corporate governance. This result suggests that restrictions on the number of board seats a single director can hold are more likely to be bene…cial in countries with weak governance systems.
For a similar reason, policies that indirectly a¤ect directors'reputational concerns can also be a double-edged sword, whose e¤ect depends on the existing governance system. In particular, we show that increasing board size or improving boardroom transparency is likely to strengthen corporate governance if aggregate governance is already strong, but weaken governance even further if aggregate governance is weak. Thus, our study highlights that due to externalities in the labor market for directors, board size a¤ects governance not only within but also across …rms, and that improved transparency may have adverse consequences. 6 Finally, we show that due to directors'reputational concerns, policies that strengthen corporate governance may actually decrease shareholder welfare for two distinct reasons. First, 5 Directors'reputational concerns can also be a¤ected by regulations that change the value of a given directorship or include term or age limits on directors. Note that restrictions on the number of directorships are often introduced to allow directors to devote more time and attention to the …rms on whose boards they serve. We abstract from director busyness and highlight a novel e¤ect of restrictions on the number of directorships, working through directors'reputational concerns. 6 One policy that has increased boardroom transparency is the 2004 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure law, which requires companies to disclose if one of their directors leaves the board due to a disagreement. Prior to the SEC ruling, disclosure was only required if the director leaving the …rm requested his resignation letter to be made public. The new ruling requires all such departures to be disclosed in the …rm's 8-K …ling within four business days after the event, even if the director did not provide any written correspondence or request that the matter is made public. In China, a somewhat similar 2004 law requires …rms to disclose the names of those independent directors who vote in dissent (Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013) ). when aggregate governance becomes stronger and hence a shareholder-friendly reputation becomes more valuable, directors will allocate more control to shareholders solely in order to signal their shareholder-friendliness, and not because more shareholder control is actually optimal. This may lead to ine¢ ciently high levels of shareholder control in cases when leaving some control to the management is valuable due to management expertise or the importance of managerial initiative. Second, strong governance can make a shareholder-friendly reputation so valuable that even the most management-friendly directors will take observable actions that will help them to be perceived as shareholder-friendly. This makes it di¢ cult for shareholders to understand directors'intrinsic characteristics and hence to make informed director appointment decisions. 7 The paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of the section discusses the related literature. Section 1 introduces the setup. Section 2 presents the analysis, including the comparative statics results, implications for welfare, and the discussion of several extensions. Section 3 o¤ers testable predictions and describes the related empirical literature. Section 4 concludes and discusses other potential applications of our framework. All proofs are delegated to the Appendix and supplemental results are given in the Online Appendix.
Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature on reputational concerns, where agents distort their decisions to convince the market that their quality is high (e.g., Holmstrom (1999) ). As in our paper, reputational concerns in these models can lead to strategic interactions between agents or between the agent and the market. 8 In contrast to most of the existing literature, 7 We also show that an increase in the proportion of independent directors on the board, which is a policy intended to bene…t shareholders, may actually lead to a lower probability of shareholder control. 8 For example, reputational concerns can create herding behavior (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Zwiebel (1995) ). Relatedly, Ordonez (2013) shows that reputational concerns in credit markets lead to strategic complementarities in risk-taking between borrowers. our model features two con ‡icting types of reputation -shareholder-friendly and managementfriendly. In Bar-Isaac and Deb (2013) and Bouvard and Levy (2013) , the agent also cares about reputation with two di¤erent audiences (the two audiences in our setting are shareholders and managers), but the unique feature of our model is that the actions a player takes to build a certain type of reputation increase the value of this reputation for other players and, due to strategic complementarities, the equilibrium market value of this reputation. 9 In the context of directors'reputational concerns, our paper is related to Song and Thakor (2006) , Ruiz-Verdu and Singh (2011), and Levit (2012) . While these papers focus on boardmanagement interactions within a single …rm, we study how directors'reputational concerns a¤ect all …rms in the economy and emphasize the externalities in corporate governance.
The literature has pointed out that governance externalities can arise from competition for managers (Acharya and Volpin (2010), Acharya, Gabarro, and Volpin (2013), and Dicks (2012)), the takeover market (Burkart and Ra¤ (2013) ), and the quality of reported earnings (Nielsen (2006) and Cheng (2011) ). Our paper identi…es a novel channel of governance externalities working through directors'reputational concerns. To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to model the labor market for directors and its e¤ect on equilibrium board structures.
In this respect, our paper contributes to the literature that studies how the structure of the board a¤ects board decisions. 10 9 See also Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Frenkel (2014), and Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988). Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) study a model of career concerns with multi-tasking and show that if the agent has incentives to demonstrate high talent and talent and e¤ort are complements, multiple equilibria can exist. Because their paper does not feature con ‡icting types of reputation, the reason for multiplicity of equilibria in their model is di¤erent from ours. 10 
Setup
There are two identical …rms in the economy, and the board of each …rm consists of K 2 directors. 11 The game has two stages -the allocation of control stage, followed by the director labor market stage.
At the …rst stage, each director decides whether to vote for a proposal that transfers control of the …rm from the manager, who has control by default, to the shareholders. an odd number and T = K+1 2 , then the collective decision-making rule is a simple majority requirement. We assume that individual votes are not observable, but the allocation of control = i ; j is observable. 12 We assume that directors di¤er in their shareholder-friendliness. A shareholder-friendly director has a higher relative bene…t from shareholder control than a management-friendly 11 In Section 2.3.4, we discuss an extension to a general number of …rms. In unreported analysis, we analyze the case K = 1 and the case of asymmetric …rms and obtain similar results. 12 In Section 2.3.3, we discuss an extension in which individual directors'votes are observable as well.
director. This heterogeneity could be due to di¤erent objectives or di¤erences in opinion. For example, even if all directors aim to maximize shareholder value, they may disagree on whether the best way to achieve this objective is by giving control to shareholders or to the manager. 13 In particular, the type of director k of …rm i is ik , where ik is distributed according to a continuous symmetric distribution function F ( ) with mean E [ ], bounded density f ( ), and full support on R. 14 The direct utility of a director of type ik from the allocation of control in
) and v (0; ) are non-negative and continuously di¤erentiable.
We assume that v (1; ) is increasing in and v (0; ) is decreasing in . Thus, high stands for
shareholder-friendliness, and low stands for management-friendliness. Types are independent across directors, and the type of each director is the director's private information. 15 It is useful to de…ne a director's relative bene…t from shareholder control:
Given our assumptions on v (1; ) and v (0; ), it follows that @ ( ) @ > 0. We make the following additional assumptions on ( ). First, we assume that lim !1 ( ) = 1 and lim ! 1 ( ) = 1. This assumption ensures that if a director is su¢ ciently shareholderfriendly (management-friendly), his direct utility from shareholder (management) control is su¢ ciently large and induces him to vote in favor (against) shareholder control despite any 13 Giving control to the manager could enhance shareholder value either because the success of the …rm depends on managerial initiative and …rm-speci…c investments that the manager has incentives to take only if he has control (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)) or because the manager has expertise and private information that he will not communicate to the board unless he has control (e.g., Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) ). In Section 2.3.1, we build on this interpretation and discuss the case in which the relative value from shareholder control can di¤er across …rms. 14 All the results hold for asymmetric distributions of types as well. 15 It is not necessary for our results that ik is perfectly transferable across …rms. Directors may adapt their behavior and conform to the existing corporate governance system of the …rms in which they serve as board members. As long as there is some level of persistence of directors'types, our results continue to hold. Consistent with the assumption that ik is transferable across …rms, Bouwman (2011) …nds that a …rm's governance practices move in the direction of governance practices of other …rms its directors serve at. reputational concerns. This assumption is made for simplicity and does not a¤ect the main results. 16 Second, we assume E [ ( )] = 0. This means that on average, directors' relative bene…t from shareholder control is zero. 17 Finally, we assume that directors do not incur any costs of voting against management. If such costs were present, directors would have weaker incentives to vote for shareholder control, especially due to free-riding within the board. Since our focus is on externalities between …rms, we abstract from costly voting and free-riding, but our main results would continue to hold in the setting with costly voting as well.
At the second stage, each …rm can be hit by a shock, in which case exactly one of its directors resigns and the …rm has to appoint a new director. For example, directors may have to resign due to health issues, family reasons, retirement, or because they have been appointed to an executive position. The shocks are independent from the allocations of control i , from directors'types ik , and are independent across …rms. The probability that the …rm is hit by a shock is 2 (0; 1), and each of K directors has an equal chance of being hit by the shock.
Thus, for each director, the unconditional probability of resigning is K . Directors get utility from the allocation of control in their …rm whether or not they resign. If a director resigns from the board, he no longer participates in the labor market for directors and does not get any direct utility from resignation. If a director does not resign, he can also be appointed to the board of the other …rm if that …rm was hit by a resignation shock and needs a new director.
If a director resigns, his …rm searches for a new director. The …rm can either hire any director of its peer …rm who did not resign, or an outside candidate, who is not serving on any board. We assume that the supply of outside candidates is unlimited and that outside candidates are drawn from the same distribution F , so their expected type equals E [ ].
If a director is hired by another …rm, he gets an additional utility. Speci…cally, if a director 16 If ( ) is bounded, then in addition to the threshold equilibria described below, there also exist pooling equilibria, in which all types follow the same strategy of voting in favor (or against) shareholder control, but the results do not change qualitatively. 17 All results, except the analysis of director welfare in the Online Appendix, hold for any value of E [ ( )], including in…nity. In the Online Appendix, we discuss how the welfare analysis depends on the sign of E [ ( )].
from …rm i joins the board of …rm j, he gets > 0. The parameter can be thought of as the strength of directors'reputational concerns. 18 While directors'…nancial compensation might be a¤ected by the demand and supply of directors in the labor market, a large component of directors'utility from board seats is non-pecuniary. Indeed, when asked about their personal bene…ts from serving on the board, directors list prestige, valuable connections, intellectual stimulation, power, and the opportunity to develop new areas of expertise as being more important than …nancial compensation (see, e.g., Lorsch and MacIver (1989) and the PwC's 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey). Matveyev (2013) notes that all outside directors within a …rm usually get the same pay, and almost all within-…rm variation in compensation comes from the fees directors get from serving on special committees. For these reasons, and for simplicity, we abstract from the e¤ects of the labor market on and take it as a given parameter. In the Online Appendix, we endogenize by assuming that the controlling party can o¤er the new director a contract that is contingent on his actions after he joins the …rm. In addition, in unreported analysis, we show that all results of the basic model continue to hold even if depends on the shareholder-friendliness of the director and the allocation of control in the …rm he is joining. 19 Importantly, the allocation of control in the …rm a¤ects who makes the new director appointment decision if one of the directors resigns. Speci…cally, if the manager has control ( i = 0), then the manager makes the appointment decision, and if shareholders have control ( i = 1), then shareholders make the appointment decision. 20 We assume, as described in detail below, that shareholders have a preference for more shareholder-friendly directors and the manager has a preference for more management-friendly directors. Denote by h i i ; j 2 f0; 1g the hiring decision of …rm i based on the allocation of control in both …rms and given that one of the directors of …rm i has resigned. Speci…cally, if the …rm hires an outside candidate, then h i = 0, and if it hires one of the directors of …rm j, then h i = 1. The hiring decision of …rm i depends on the allocation of control in …rm j since the allocation of control in a …rm is informative about the shareholder-friendliness of its directors. In particular, let jk denote the reputation of director k in …rm j, de…ned as the expected type of the director at the beginning of the second stage. Since directors'individual votes are not observable, all directors within a …rm will have the same reputation in equilibrium. The reputation of directors in …rm j will be a function of the allocation of control j and will be endogenously determined by the voting strategies e jk ( jk ), k = 1; :::; K. We denote by j j = E jk j j the equilibrium expected type of directors in …rm j given the allocation of control j . We assume that if several directors of …rm j have the same reputation and did not resign, they are equally likely to be invited to …rm i. We also assume that …rms prefer hiring a director currently serving on the other board over hiring an outside candidate whenever the two directors have the same reputation.
Shareholders and managers derive direct utility from the allocation of control in their …rm, as well as utility from the composition of their board. We assume that shareholders prefer shareholder control over management control and a shareholder-friendly board over a managementfriendly board and that management has the opposite preferences. We also assume that the aggregate shareholders'and managers'utility is higher under shareholder control and with a more shareholder-friendly board, re ‡ecting the idea that management control can create in-e¢ ciencies. Speci…cally, if after the second stage the pro…le of directors' types in …rm i is ( i1 ; :::; iK ) and i 1 K P K k=1 ik is the board's average type, then the utility of shareholders access to large shareholders. Second, it depends on whether the …rm uses majority or plurality voting for director elections. Finally, it is a¤ected by the overall independence of the board: the more independent the board is, the easier it is for directors to recommend candidates who are not supported by the manager. and managers is, respectively, given by
where
decreasing function, and g SH + g M is an increasing function. 21 For tractability, we assume that g SH and g M are linear. All the results, except the analysis of welfare in Section 2.2, are derived for general increasing functions g SH and g M .
Note that we implicitly assume that the controlling party only cares about the new director's shareholder-friendliness and abstract from the e¤ect of other relevant factors, such as directors' experience and expertise. Our results will continue to hold in a setting where the party making the appointment decisions also cares about directors'expertise, as long as expertise and shareholder-friendliness are not perfectly correlated across directors. In addition, it is often argued that given the board's dual role as both a monitor and advisor, even shareholders may prefer to have some management-friendly directors on the board (e.g., Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) ). We discuss this possibility in Section 2.3.1.
Solution concept
Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE):
De…nition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set of directors' voting strategies e ik ( ik ), e jk ( jk ), beliefs about directors'types i ( i ), and …rms'hiring strategies h i i ; j such that the following conditions are satis…ed:
1. The voting decision of director k of …rm i maximizes his expected utility, where beliefs 21 The assumption v SH (0) = v M (1) = 0 is just a normalization.
about directors' types i ( i ), other directors' voting strategies e ik ( ik ), e jk ( jk ), and …rm j's hiring strategy h j j ; i are taken as given.
2.
The hiring decision of the controlling party of …rm i maximizes its expected utility, where beliefs j j and directors'voting strategies e ik ( ik ), e jk ( jk ) are taken as given.
3. Whenever possible, beliefs about directors' types are consistent with Bayes' rule, where directors'voting strategies e ik ( ik ), e jk ( jk ) are taken as given.
We restrict attention to equilibria that survive small perturbations in the equilibrium strategies of other directors at the same …rm. Formally, we introduce a re…nement that is similar to the "trembling hand"re…nement in normal form games (e.g., Kreps (1990) ).
De…nition 2 Consider any equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium is called trembling hand perfect if for any sequence f n g, n 2 (0; 1), lim n!1 n = 1, for each …rm i, director k 0 , and type , there exists n 0 < 1 such that if:
(i) all directors of …rm i except k 0 play their equilibrium strategy e ik ( ) with probability n and make a mistake playing 1 e ik ( ) with probability 1 n , and (ii) all directors of …rm j 6 = i play their equilibrium strategy e jk ( ), then for any n > n 0 , given beliefs i (1) and i (0), the best response of director k 0 of …rm i if his type is is his equilibrium strategy e ik 0 ( ).
Analysis
Consider the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game that satisfy De…nition 2. Consider conditional on …rm j hiring one of the directors of …rm i, director k will be hired with probability 1 K . Hence, if j denotes the ex-ante probability that shareholders of …rm j obtain control, then the expected bene…t of the director from obtaining reputation i is given by
Note that for any ; such that > E [ ] > , ( ; ) > ( ; ) if and only if > 0:5.
Intuitively, whether a director wants to have a shareholder-friendly or a management-friendly reputation depends on the allocation of control in other …rms. If managers (shareholders) are the main decision-makers in other …rms, i.e., is small (large), then the director is more likely to be invited to other boards if he is known for being management-friendly (shareholder-friendly).
Let U ik ( ik ; i ) be the expected utility of director k in …rm i given his type ik , allocation of control in his …rm i , and taking as given beliefs i and the probability of shareholder control in the other …rm j . Then U ik ( ik ; i ) is given by
Using (4), the following lemma shows that in equilibrium, all directors within a …rm follow the same strategy and vote for the proposal if and only if their preference for shareholder control is su¢ ciently strong.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, there exists a …nite i such that e ik ( ) = 1 if and only if > i .
Lemma 1 implies that all directors in a …rm follow the same threshold voting strategy. The threshold i a¤ects the likelihood that shareholders obtain control, which is given by
where C K t = K! t!(K t)! is the Binomial coe¢ cient. In addition, the threshold i a¤ects the formation of directors'reputation. To capture this, we denote the reputation function in equilibrium with a threshold i by i ( i ; i ). The proof of Lemma 2 derives the expressions for i ( i ; i ) and shows that directors whose …rm is controlled by shareholders (managers) are perceived to be more (less) shareholder-friendly than an outside candidate:
Lemma 2 Consider any equilibrium characterized by a threshold i . Then,
Consider the best response function i ( j ) of directors in …rm i, taking as given that directors in …rm j vote for shareholder control when their type exceeds the threshold j . The best response function de…nes the threshold i ( j ) such that only types > i ( j ) vote for shareholder control. From (4) and the proof of Lemma 1, it follows that i ( j ) = ( j ), where
and 1 ( ) is the inverse of the function ( ). Because ( ) is strictly increasing, continuous, and takes all values on ( 1; +1), its inverse 1 ( ) is a well de…ned, strictly increasing, and continuous function. Since, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, ( ) decreases with and takes all values between 0 and 1, the best response function ( ) increases in and takes all values in the interval
Since the best response threshold of directors in …rm i is increasing in the threshold of directors in its peer …rm j, the game exhibits strategic complementarity. Intuitively, if directors of …rm j are more likely to vote for the proposal ( j decreases), then shareholders of …rm j are more likely to get control and have the power to appoint directors to their board. Therefore, the relative reward of directors in …rm i from building a shareholder-friendly reputation becomes higher. This increases the incentives of directors in …rm i to vote for shareholder control, decreasing the threshold i .
The following lemma characterizes the set of equilibria using the properties of ( ) and the symmetry of the best response functions.
Lemma 3 An equilibrium always exists, and any equilibrium is symmetric.
Since all equilibria of the game are symmetric, i.e., i = for all i, then any equilibrium is the solution of ( ) = . It also follows that the reputation functions i ( ; ) are identical across …rms. We denote this function by ( ; ). Given (6) and the property of ( ; ) discussed above, ( (1; ) ; ( )) > ( (0; ) ; ( )) if and only if ( ) > 0:5. In other words, a shareholder-friendly reputation generates a higher payo¤ than a managementfriendly reputation if and only if there is a higher than 50% chance that the other …rm will be controlled by shareholders. As we explain below, identifying which type of reputation is more valuable has important implications for the analysis. Motivated by this argument, the next de…nition classi…es potential equilibria into two types. Due to strategic complementarity, our model can have multiple equilibria. Moreover, the next proposition shows that when reputational concerns are su¢ ciently important, there always exist at least one shareholder-friendly and at least one management-friendly equilibrium. Thus, equilibria with strong and weak governance can co-exist for a given set of parameters, suggesting that countries or industries with similar characteristics can have di¤erent corporate governance systems as an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1 There exist and , 0 < < 1, such that:
(i) If > , there exist at least one shareholder-friendly equilibrium and at least one management-friendly equilibrium.
(ii) If < , all equilibria are of the same type. In particular, all equilibria are managementfriendly if ( 1 (0:5)) < 0 and shareholder-friendly if ( 1 (0:5)) > 0.
(iii) If < , the equilibrium is unique.
The reason behind Proposition 1 is that strategic complementarity between …rms'corporate governance systems arises due to directors' reputational concerns, represented by parameter . When increases, reputation becomes more important for directors, and hence strategic complementarity becomes stronger. Therefore, multiple equilibria are more likely to exist when reputational concerns are signi…cant. Figure 1 ), the graph of the best response function crosses the 45-degree line in three points, corresponding to three equilibria. Two of them ( around -2.01 and -0.04) are shareholder-friendly, and the third one ( around 1.61) is management-friendly.
Comparative statics
All equilibria of the game can be ranked by the aggregate quality of corporate governance, de…ned as the probability that shareholders get control, ( ). Equilibria with a lower are more shareholder-friendly and feature stronger corporate governance. This section analyzes the comparative statics of corporate governance.
Since the best response function ( ) is bounded and increasing, by Tarski's …xed point theorem, ( ) has the least and the greatest …xed points (equilibria). We denote these two equilibria by and respectively and call them the "most shareholder-friendly"and the "least shareholder-friendly" equilibria of the game. 22 Given the potential multiplicity of equilibria, we focus on the comparative statics in these extremal equilibria, as is common in games of strategic complementarities (e.g., Vives (2005) ). 23 Proposition 2 Suppose that is either or and let ( ). Then:
(i) increases with if and only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly.
(ii) If F 2 ( ) …rst-order stochastically dominates F 1 ( ), then 2 1 .
(iii) Given K, decreases with T .
(iv) Suppose K is …xed and consider a change in K :
(iv:a) Suppose T is …xed. Then, increases with K.
(iv:b) Suppose T = K (unanimity rule). Then, decreases with K.
(iv:c) Suppose K is odd and T = K+1 2 (simple majority rule). Let K 2 > K 1 and suppose that > (K 1 ), where (K) is de…ned by Proposition 1. Then, 2 1 if and only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly.
The …rst statement of Proposition 2 shows that stronger directors'reputational concerns improve corporate governance only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly. This is because in a management-friendly equilibrium, managers of other …rms, rather than shareholders, make the appointment decisions, and hence having a shareholder-friendly reputation hurts directors' chances of being invited to other boards. In this sense, directors'reputational concerns amplify corporate governance: as increases, strong governance systems become stronger and weak systems become weaker. This suggests that a regulation that increases the value of reputation in the director labor market (e.g., increasing the allowed number of directorships a person can hold) strengthens governance only if the existing governance system is su¢ ciently strong.
According to the second statement of the proposition, if the population of directors becomes more shareholder-friendly (for example, due to a regulation that increases all directors' accountability to shareholders), the equilibrium probability of shareholder control increases.
Note also that a higher likelihood of shareholder-friendly directors leads to a higher probability of shareholder control for two reasons. First, keeping directors'threshold strategy …xed, it is more likely that each individual director's type will be above the threshold. This e¤ect is ampli…ed by the decrease in directors'equilibrium threshold : knowing that the other …rm is now more likely to be controlled by shareholders, each director has stronger incentives to vote for shareholder control and thereby build a shareholder-friendly reputation.
The intuition behind the third statement is straightforward: all else equal, a higher majority requirement reduces the probability that shareholders obtain control. Part (a) of the fourth statement implies that if T is …xed, a larger board size improves corporate governance.
Intuitively, with a larger board, it is easier to deviate from the status quo and transfer control to shareholders. In contrast, part (b) shows that under the unanimity voting rule, a larger board size leads to weaker governance. Indeed, with unanimity, shareholders obtain control only if all directors vote for it. The larger the board, the more likely that at least one director is su¢ ciently management-friendly and votes against shareholder control. Note that in all parts of the fourth statement, we keep K constant as we increase K, that is, we simultaneously increase . This captures the idea that when the board is larger, it is more likely that at least one of its directors will have to resign. If remained constant as K increased, then all else equal, each director would be less likely to be hired by the other …rm simply because the supply of directors would be larger. This e¤ect is similar to the e¤ect of a decrease in , which we discuss in part (i) of the proposition. We therefore …x K to emphasize that K a¤ects the equilibrium in a novel way, which is di¤erent from this supply e¤ect.
In practice, boards generally make decisions based on a simple majority rule. 24 Part (c) of the fourth statement shows that under a simple majority rule, a larger board size improves corporate governance if and only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly. Thus, increasing board size ampli…es governance in the sense that weak governance systems become weaker and strong governance systems become stronger as board size increases. Intuitively, under a simple majority rule, the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly (management-friendly) if the probability that each director votes for shareholder control is greater (smaller) than 0.5. An increase in board size reduces the uncertainty about the outcome of the vote: as K increases, the likelihood that at least half of the board will vote for shareholder control increases (decreases).
By making the outcome of the vote in the peer …rm more predictable, a larger board size e¤ectively ampli…es a director's reputational concerns and thus ampli…es corporate governance by a similar intuition as before.
This intuition also implies that corporate governance is more likely to be self-ful…lling when board size is larger. For example, if directors of …rm i believe that each director of …rm j is likely to vote for shareholders ( is small), a large board size implies that …rm j is very likely to be controlled by shareholders, giving directors of …rm i strong incentives to vote for shareholders as well. Thus, when K is su¢ ciently large, beliefs that is small become self-ful…lling. 25 The following lemma formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 4 Suppose
K is …xed and consider a simple majority rule. If both types of equilibria (shareholder-and management-friendly) co-exist for a given K, they also co-exist for any larger K. Moreover, if (E [ ]) 6 = 0, there exist 1 and 2 , 0 < 1 < 2 < 1, such that:
(i) If 1 , then only one type of equilibrium exists for any K 3.
(ii) If 2 ( 1 ; 2 ), then there existsK > 3 such that both types of equilibria co-exist if and only if K K .
(iii) If 2 , then both types of equilibria co-exist for any K 3.
We conclude the comparative statics analysis by noting that small changes in parameters are ampli…ed due to strategic complementarity of directors' voting decisions. Consider, for example, a decrease in the voting requirement T . The direct e¤ect of a decrease in T is that if directors'strategies are …xed, control is more likely to be shifted to shareholders since the proposal requires the approval of a smaller number of directors. In addition, realizing that the peer …rm is now more likely to be controlled by shareholders, directors have stronger incentives to create a shareholder-friendly reputation. This second, indirect e¤ect, induces directors to vote for shareholder control and magni…es the direct e¤ect. This ampli…cation e¤ect is standard in games with strategic complementarities. 26 
Welfare
In this section, we analyze the welfare implications of the model. We start by deriving players' Similarly, the expected utility of management from the allocation of control in its …rm is
. If c ( ) denotes the expected composition (average type) of the board after the labor market stage in equilibrium with a threshold , then, because g SH and g M are linear, the total expected utility of shareholders of …rm i is given by
and the total expected utility of the management is given by 26 Formally, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that for a parameter p, @ @p = M ( ) @ ( ) @p j = , where @ ( ) @p j = captures the direct e¤ect of parameter p, and the multiplier M ( ) =
The …rst term corresponds to the case where there is no resignation shock in …rm i, and hence the expected average type is the prior regardless of the allocation of control. All other terms relate to cases where …rm i is hit by a resignation shock. The second term corresponds to the case where shareholders get control in …rm i but management retains control of …rm j.
Since shareholders of …rm i then hire the outside candidate with reputation E [ ] to replace the resigning director, and since the reputation of the remaining directors of …rm i is (1; ), the expected average type of the board conditional on this event is K 1
The third term corresponds to the case where shareholders get control in both …rms. Since shareholders then hire a director of the other …rm, whose reputation is (1; ), and since the reputation of the remaining directors is also (1; ), the expected average type of the board conditional on this event is (1; ). The fourth and …fth terms are derived similarly and correspond to the cases where …rm i is controlled by management, while …rm j is controlled by shareholders and management, respectively. The next result describes several properties of c ( ).
Lemma 5 c ( ) has the following properties:
Since g SH is increasing and g M is decreasing, Lemma 5, combined with (8) and (9), implies that shareholders' (managers') expected utility in any shareholder-friendly equilibrium ( ( ) > 1 2 ) is strictly higher (lower) than their expected utility in any management-friendly equilibrium ( ( ) < 1 2 ). However, it is generally not true that more shareholder-friendly equilibria (with higher ( )) feature higher shareholder value and lower management value.
The intuition for this result is the following. Consider the shareholders of …rm i. The direct e¤ect, which we call the control e¤ect, is that as decreases and hence ( ) increases, shareholders are more likely to get control. Thus, their utility increases both due to direct bene…ts of control and due to their control over the director appointment decisions, i.e., their ability to invite directors with a shareholder-friendly reputation after learning about their type from their voting decisions. However, the indirect e¤ect is that when the equilibrium is very shareholder-friendly ( is very low), directors of …rm j vote for shareholder control almost regardless of their types. As a result, shareholders of …rm i learn very little about the type of directors of …rm j from these directors'decision to give control to shareholders. Thus, the privilege of controlling the composition of the board is o¤set by the inability to …nd directors who are intrinsically shareholder-friendly. For example, when ( ) ! f0; 1g, there is no learning at all and hence no bene…t from controlling the composition of the board. We call this novel e¤ect the learning e¤ect. 27 It is important to note that shareholders always bene…t from more shareholder control in their own …rm (i.e., from lower i ). The learning e¤ect only applies to shareholders'utility from the allocation of control in the other …rm, j : when j is low, shareholders of …rm i learn little about directors from …rm j and may prefer a higher j . Lemma 5 implies that c ( ) is non-monotonic. Figure 2 presents the graph of c ( ) for = 0:2, K = 9, T = 5, and a standard normal distribution of types. Generally, the sign of 27 Note that c ( ) = E [ ] in the case ( ) = 1 2 as well. However, here, the intuition is di¤erent: in contrast to equilibria where ( ) ! f0; 1g, learning takes place when ( ) = 1 2 . Nevertheless, the expected type of the board equals the prior because the increase in board shareholder-friendliness when shareholders have control is exactly o¤set by the decrease in shareholder-friendliness when management has control. @c( ) @ determines whether the learning e¤ect dominates the control e¤ect. When @c( ) @ < 0, the expected composition of the board becomes more shareholder-friendly as the equilibrium becomes more shareholder-friendly. In these cases, the learning e¤ect is always dominated by the control e¤ect, and hence shareholders'expected utility increases in the shareholder-friendliness of the equilibrium. However, when @c( ) @ > 0, a more shareholder-friendly equilibrium can decrease shareholder welfare because the board becomes more management-friendly.
The presence of the learning e¤ect implies that policies that strengthen corporate governance in the economy may not always bene…t shareholders. For example, even though a regulation that increases directors'accountability to shareholders improves governance according to the comparative statics in Proposition 2 (ii), it does not necessarily increase shareholder welfare. Moreover, due to strategic complementarity, even a policy that only targets …rm i by improving its corporate governance can nevertheless harm shareholders of …rm i. This is because such a policy spills over to other …rms, making directors of other …rms more likely to give control to shareholders regardless of their type and thus making it di¢ cult for shareholders of …rm i to make informed director appointment decisions. In the Online Appendix, we derive the aggregate expected utility of directors and show that it is non-monotonic in . We also show that under certain conditions, directors'expected utility increases in the shareholder-friendliness of the equilibrium (decreases in ) if and only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly.
Implications for social welfare and Pareto e¢ ciency
Due to the learning e¤ect and the non-monotonicity of the expected utility of directors, the e¤ect of on the social welfare function that takes into account all players, including shareholders, managers, and directors, is generally ambiguous. Suppose, however, that the social welfare function puts a su¢ ciently small weight on the welfare of directors, so that the e¤ect of on social welfare is determined by its e¤ect on the combined utility of shareholders and management only. Then, the assumptions v SH (1) v M (0) and g 0 SH + g 0 M 0, together with Lemma 5, imply that social welfare in any shareholder-friendly equilibrium is higher than social welfare in any management-friendly equilibrium. Moreover, note that
Therefore, if the learning e¤ect is dominated by the control e¤ect ( @c( ) @ 0), then social welfare locally increases with the shareholder-friendliness of the equilibrium.
While the analysis of social welfare is generally ambiguous, more can be said about Pareto e¢ ciency:
Lemma 6 (i) No shareholder-friendly equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a management-friendly equilibrium, and vice versa.
, then every equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient.
In particular, the second statement of the lemma implies that all equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient if there are no e¢ ciency losses from management control and from a managementfriendly board, that is, if v SH (1) = v M (0) and g 0 SH + g 0 M = 0.
Extensions
In this section, we discuss several extensions of the basic model. The formal setups, results, and proofs for these extensions are provided in the Online Appendix.
Value of shareholder control
If managers have high expertise or if they need to be given incentives to make …rm-speci…c investments, shareholders may be better o¤ delegating control to them. 28 We analyze an extension where the optimal allocation of control varies across …rms and show that the extended model exhibits strategic complementarity as well. Moreover, directors' reputational concerns may now give rise to excessive shareholder control: if a shareholder-friendly reputation is rewarded in the labor market, directors may allocate control to shareholders to signal their shareholder-friendliness even though management control is optimal. This new type of ine¢ ciency suggests that regulators and exchanges should exercise caution in imposing corporate governance requirements. Suppose, for example, that a new listing standard increased the minimum percentage of independent directors on the board to 75%, which would result in the optimal level of shareholder control if directors had no reputational concerns. However, realizing that other …rms are now more likely to be controlled by shareholders, directors would have stronger incentives to transfer control to shareholders in their own …rms to signal their shareholder-friendliness. As a result, the regulation could shift the equilibrium to even higher levels of board independence and an excessively high level of shareholder control.
Board independence
To formally study the e¤ect of board independence, we consider an extension where some directors are insiders and always vote for management control. If the strategies of independent directors were not a¤ected by board structure, a higher number of insiders would increase the likelihood of management control. Interestingly, however, if insiders participate in the labor market for directors, then independent directors can be more likely to vote for shareholders in the presence of insiders. Intuitively, an increase in the number of insiders decreases the supply of incumbent shareholder-friendly directors and increases the supply of incumbent managementfriendly directors, which increases the relative value of a shareholder-friendly reputation due to competition for board seats. In the Online Appendix, we show that the overall e¤ect can be such that the presence of insiders leads to a higher probability of shareholder control.
Boardroom transparency
While the board's decision-making process is generally opaque, recent regulations have increased boardroom transparency, making the behavior of individual directors more visible (see footnote 6). To capture this, we analyze an extension where directors' individual votes are observed. We show that transparency makes the most (least) shareholder-friendly equilibrium more (less) shareholder-friendly and thereby ampli…es corporate governance. This result is similar in spirit to Proposition 2 (i), which shows that directors'reputational concerns amplify governance. Intuitively, this is because transparency strengthens the link between a director's individual vote and his reputation. If aggregate governance is weak and a management-friendly reputation is more valuable, directors may be more reluctant to oppose the management when they know that their actions will be observed. Thus, increasing boardroom transparency with the goal of strengthening a weak governance system is likely to achieve the opposite outcome.
Similar to the basic model, the extended model features strategic complementarities be-tween directors's decisions across …rms. However, transparency also gives rise to strategic substitutability between directors'decisions within …rms. The reason is that directors within a …rm compete for the board seat at the other …rm and hence can bene…t from di¤erentiating their reputation from each other. It follows that the labor market for directors creates incentives for non-conformity within the boardroom.
Multiple …rms
We extend the model to N 2 …rms and show that our main results continue to hold.
Importantly, based on the allocation of control across …rms after the …rst stage, the market is divided into two sets: …rms controlled by shareholders search among directors with a shareholder-friendly reputation, and …rms controlled by managers search among directors with a management-friendly reputation. Thus, there is governance-related segmentation in the labor market for directors. As the number of …rms becomes in…nitely large, the externalities due to reputational e¤ects disappear. However, given that the labor market for directors is segmented both by industry and by geographical location (see the discussion in Section 3), we think of N as representing the number of …rms in the relevant segment and hence not being very large.
Empirical predictions
In this section, we discuss our paper in the context of the existing empirical literature and o¤er new testable predictions. We are not aware of other theories that have these predictions.
The premise of our paper is that directors trade o¤ two con ‡icting types of reputationone for being shareholder-friendly and one for being management-friendly. Consistent with the existence of this trade-o¤, the literature has found mixed results with respect to whether the labor market rewards directors for imposing discipline on the management. Consistent with the view that a shareholder-friendly reputation is rewarded, several papers …nd that directors are held accountable for failing to monitor the management. 29 Conversely, consistent with the view that a management-friendly reputation is rewarded, Helland (2006) …nds that directors of …rms charged with fraud experience an increase in the number of outside directorships, and Marshall (2011) shows that directors who resign from the board over a disagreement experience a loss in board seats over the …ve year period following the dispute. 30 Most of the existing literature looks at the aggregate number of board seats gained by directors. In contrast, our paper emphasizes that whether directors'shareholder-friendly actions will be rewarded by invitations to boards of other …rms crucially depends on the balance of power at these …rms. Formally, the …rst implication is the following.
Prediction 1 Directors who demonstrate shareholder-friendliness are more (less) likely to be subsequently appointed to boards of …rms with stronger (weaker) corporate governance.
Shareholder-friendly directors can be identi…ed as those who vote against the management (Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013)) or leave the board due to a disagreement (Marshall (2011) ).
Alternatively, one can look at …rms where a director holds a board seat and measure the observable changes in these …rms'corporate governance during the director's tenure (e.g., removal of antitakeover defenses or CEO-chairman separation). Zajac and Westphal (1996) , Eminet and Guedri (2010), and Bouwman (2011) …nd evidence consistent with the …rst prediction.
For example, Zajac and Westphal (1996) show that directors on boards that have recently increased the ratio of outside directors, separated the CEO and chairman positions, or decreased executive compensation, have fewer subsequent appointments to …rms with low board control 29 Coles and Hoi (2003) show that directors who rejected the Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 antitakeover provisions were three times as likely to gain additional directorships than those who retained the provisions. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) …nd that following a …nancial fraud lawsuit, directors are likely to lose board seats at other …rms, particularly those with strong governance. See also Harford (2003) , Yermack (2004) , Srinivasan (2005) , Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2010), Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013), and Fos and Tsoutsoura (2013). 30 Relatedly, Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2011) …nd no evidence that directors of …rms involved in option backdating incur reputational penalties at other …rms. but more appointments to …rms with high board control. 31 Our paper also emphasizes the existence of corporate governance externalities between …rms. While governance externalities can be due to several reasons, the unique feature of our model is that externalities arise due to directors'reputational concerns in the labor market. Thus, another empirical implication, which helps distinguish our mechanism from other potential mechanisms, is the following.
Prediction 2 A positive exogenous shock to corporate governance of one …rm improves corporate governance of other …rms, and this spillover e¤ect is greater for …rms whose directors have stronger reputational concerns.
Since governance externalities arise through the labor market for directors, they are likely to be stronger across …rms in the same segment of the labor market, such as …rms in the same geographic area and …rms in the same industry. Indeed, the market for directors is somewhat segmented both by geographic location (e.g., Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) ) and by industry, since …rms look for candidates with relevant expertise and industry knowledge (e.g., Dass et al. (2014) ). Thus, the empirical predictions of this section are likely to be stronger if a …rm's peer group is de…ned as …rms in related industries or …rms in close geographic proximity. In this sense, Prediction 2 is consistent with the evidence in Albuquerque et al.
(2014), who show that following a cross-border acquisition, the local industry rivals of the target …rm experience improvements in corporate governance. In addition, as the results of Section 2.3.4 demonstrate, the externalities between …rms become weaker as the number of …rms increases. Hence, the empirical predictions of this section should be the strongest when the relative segment of the market is relatively small, for example, if the …rm's industry is 31 Bouwman (2011) shows that a …rm is more likely to select an individual as its director if this individual is a director at …rms whose governance practices are similar to the …rm's existing governance practices. In the context of French …rms, Eminet and Guedri (2010) …nd that directors who implement governance reforms that increase (decrease) control over management are more likely to be appointed to boards with (without) nominating committees and boards with nominating committees dominated by non-executive (executive) directors. In addition to the maximum allowed number of directorships, directors'reputational concerns can be a¤ected by factors such as age and tenure. While several papers (e.g., Marshall (2011) and Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013)) study the e¤ect of directors'age and tenure on the likelihood that they take shareholder-friendly actions, these papers do not look at the interac-tion between directors'reputational concerns and other …rms'governance practices. Our paper emphasizes that directors with stronger reputational concerns will be more likely to act in a shareholder-friendly manner only if corporate governance of peer …rms is strong.
Finally, the comparative statics with respect to board size in Proposition 2 (iv.c) leads to the following prediction. 33 Prediction 5 An increase in board size strengthens (weakens) the …rm's corporate governance if corporate governance of other …rms is strong (weak).
Empirically, a larger board size is associated with several characteristics of weak corporate governance. For example, Yermack (1996) …nds that small boards are more likely to have non-CEO chairmen, greater levels of director stock ownership, and receive performance-based director fees, and Fahlenbrach (2009) shows that …rms with large boards have weaker shareholder rights, higher levels of CEO compensation, and lower pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. The evidence is mixed because these papers also …nd that larger boards have a higher percentage of independent directors. With this caveat, if one interprets the existing evidence as showing a negative relation between board size and governance, Proposition 2 (iv.c) and prediction 5 suggest that the US economy is in a management-friendly equilibrium.
Under this assumption, given Proposition 2 and predictions 3 and 4, we would expect increased boardroom transparency to weaken corporate governance, and restrictions on the number of directorships to strengthen corporate governance.
Predictions 3-5 refer to exogenous changes in governance characteristics such as transparency or board size, for example, due to a new regulation. In this case, these characteristics could change in a way that decreases shareholder value in a given …rm. If, however, shareholders have to approve the adoption of new governance practices, then such changes will only be made if they increase shareholder value. Under this assumption and assuming that stronger 33 Proposition 2 (iv.c) is based on the assumption that the board makes decisions based on a simple majority rule. As discussed in Section 2.1, this assumption is consistent with the observed board practices. governance increases shareholder welfare, our model predicts that a company will only limit the number of directorships its directors can hold and will only decrease transparency and board size if its peer …rms have weak corporate governance.
Note also that the key to the above predictions is the existence of two con ‡icting types of reputation and the idea that corporate governance at peer …rms determines which type of reputation is more valuable. Thus, qualitatively, these predictions do not rely on strategic complementarity of directors' voting decisions. However, due to strategic complementarity, the above e¤ects are signi…cantly ampli…ed. 34 
Conclusion
This paper develops a model of the labor market for directors and studies how directors' reputational concerns a¤ect corporate governance, the structure of the board, and shareholder value. Whether directors would like to build a reputation for being shareholder-friendly or management-friendly, is determined in equilibrium and depends on the allocation of control between shareholders and managers in other …rms. In particular, the labor market only rewards directors for being shareholder-friendly if corporate governance in most …rms is strong.
We show that directors' reputational concerns create corporate governance externalities between …rms. Stronger governance in one …rm leads to stronger governance in other …rms and vice versa, and this spillover e¤ect is stronger when directors'concerns about reputation are stronger. As a result, an equilibrium with strong aggregate governance can co-exist with an equilibrium with weak aggregate governance, suggesting that countries and industries with similar characteristics can have di¤erent governance systems. We also show that when directors' reputation in the labor market becomes more important for them, strong governance systems become stronger but weak systems become even weaker. This implies that the e¤ect of certain regulations, such as restricting the number of board seats an individual can hold or increasing transparency of board decision-making, crucially depends on the existing state of corporate governance. Our analysis provides new empirical predictions about director appointments and peer e¤ects in corporate governance.
While the focus of our paper is on the labor market for corporate directors, our framework can be applied to other settings where an agent's decisions a¤ect both his own reputation and the type of reputation that is valued at his workplace. Examples include the CEO's choice of corporate culture (e.g., the level of employee friendliness), an employee's adoption of a new technology, or an academic's choice of research agenda.
In the Online Appendix, we analyze the case where some directors are never pivotal. We show that no such equilibrium survives the trembling hand re…nement, and the only trembling hand perfect equilibria are those where each director k in each …rm i plays a threshold strategy and votes for the proposal if and only if ik i for some …nite i .
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that i ( i ; i ) is given by
Hence, i (1; i ) and i (0; i ) satisfy
where ( ) is given by (5) . Since i (1; i ) and i (0; i ) are weighted averages of terms where the smallest term in i (1; i ) is strictly higher than the largest term in i (0; i ), (6) must hold.
Proof of Lemma 3.
A symmetric equilibrium exists if the equation ( ) = has a solution. Since ( ) is bounded and continuous, by the intermediate value theorem, a solution (not necessarily unique) always exists. To prove that all equilibria are symmetric, recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that all directors within a given …rm i follow the same strategy with some threshold i . Hence, it only remains to prove the symmetry of strategies across …rms, i.e., that i = j . Suppose that there exists some asymmetric equilibrium in which i > j .
In equilibrium, i = ( j ) and j = ( i ). Therefore, ( j ) > ( i ). Since is strictly increasing, this inequality implies j > i , which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let ( ; ) denote the best response function for a given value of parameter . Since ( ) decreases in , lim ! 1 ( ) = 1 and lim !+1 ( ) = 0, then for any given T; K there exists such that ( ) = 0:5. Then ( ; ) = 1 (0) for any , and ( ) > 0:5 , < . We prove parts (i) and (ii) here and relegate the proof of Part (iii) to the Online Appendix. Consider part (i). To prove that both a managementfriendly and a shareholder-friendly equilibrium exist for a given , we need to prove that the function ( ; ) ( ; ) has at least one root on ( ; +1) and at least one root on ( 1; ), where ( ; ) is given by (7) . Since ( ; ) is bounded on 2 ( 1; +1), then lim ! 1 ( ; ) = +1 and lim !+1 ( ; ) = 1. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, both types of equilibria exist if there exist 1 < and 2 > such that ( 1 ; ) < 0 < ( 2 ; ). We next show that this condition is satis…ed for a large enough . Fix any 1 < and 2 > . By (7) , ( 1 ; ) decreases in and ( 2 ; ) increases in . Moreover, lim !1 ( 1 ; ) = 1 and lim !1 ( 2 ; ) = +1. Hence, there exists^ such that for any
). Hence, for any ^ there exists at least one shareholderfriendly and at least one management-friendly equilibrium. Consider the set A = f^ 0 : for any ^ , there exists at least one shareholder-friendly and at least one management-friendly equilibriumg. The above arguments prove that this set is non-empty. Then in the statement of the proposition is de…ned as inffAg.
Consider part (ii). First, we prove that for any 0 < , all equilibria must be of the same type. Suppose, on the contrary, that both types of equilibria exist for some 0 < , i.e., there exist 1 < and 2 > such that ( i ; 0 ) = 0. We show that in this case, both types of equilibria exist for any > 0 as well, which contradicts the de…nition of as inffAg.
Indeed, for any > 0 , ( 1 ; ) < ( 1 ; 0 ) = 0 and ( 2 ; ) > ( 2 ; 0 ) = 0. Since lim ! 1 ( ; ) = +1 and lim !+1 ( ; ) = 1, then by the intermediate value theorem, there exist 0 1 2 ( 1; 1 ) and 0 2 2 ( 2 ; +1) such that ( 0 i ; ) = 0. These are the shareholderfriendly and management-friendly equilibria for > 0 . Next, suppose 1 (0) > (<) 0.
Consider any 0 < . Since ( ; 0 ) = 1 (0) > (<) 0 and lim !+1 ( ; 0 ) = 1 (lim ! 1 ( ; 0 ) = +1), there exists^ > (<) such that ^ ; 0 = 0, i.e., there exists at least one management-friendly (shareholder-friendly) equilibrium. Since, as shown above, all equilibria are of the same type, then all equilibria must be management-friendly (shareholderfriendly).
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any parameter p. Let ( ; p) denote the best response function for a given value of this parameter, and (p) and (p) denote the greatest and the least …xed points of ( ; p). In the Online Appendix, we show that Consider part (i). In the Online Appendix, we show that if 2 f ; g, then @ ( ; ) @ j = < 1. Using the implicit function theorem for the equality ( ; ) = 0, we get @
Since @ ( ; ) @ j = < 1, then sgn @ @ = sgn @ ( ; ) @ j = . Therefore, since 1 ( ) is a strictly increasing function, @ @ > 0 , @ ( ; ) @ > 0 , ( ) < 0:5. Since ( ) is a decreasing function, then @ ( )
Next, in the Online Appendix, we also show that for any parameter p, if ( ; p) increases with p, then (p) and (p) increase with p as well. We will now use this result to prove statements (ii), (iii), (iv.a), and (iv.b). Consider part (ii). Let B K;p (x) be the cumulative density function of a Binomial distribution with parameters (K; p). Then, by the properties of the Binomial distribution, B K;p (x) is …rst-order stochastically increasing as p increases, i.e., B K;p 2 (x) < B K;p 1 (x) for p 2 > p 1 . Let parameter parameterize distribution F , such that F ( 2 ; ) …rst-order stochastically dominates F ( 1 ; ) for 2 > 1 . Then, for any , as increases, 1 F ( ) increases and B K;1 F ( ) ( ) decreases. Since ( ) = 1 B K;1 F ( ) (T 1), then ( ) increases with for any , and hence ( ; ) decreases with . By the result above, this implies that decreases with as well. Thus, ( ) increases with for two reasons:
…rst, because decreases with and second, because ( ) increases with for any given .
The implicit assumption in this analysis is that the distribution of outside candidates changes with as well, so that the expectations of the two distributions remain equal. Consider part (iii). Since ( ) = 1 B K;1 F ( ) (T 1), the function ( ) decreases with T by the properties of the Binomial distribution. Since ( ) = 1 K (1 2 ( )) , the function ( ) increases with T . Thus, by the result above, increases with T , and hence ( ) decreases with T , both because 1 F ( ) decreases and because ( ) decreases with T for any .
Consider part (iv.a). Note that B K 2 ;p (x) < B K 1 ;p (x) for K 2 > K 1 . Hence, ( ) increases with K, and thus ( ) = 1 ( (1 2 ( ))) decreases with K for a …xed T . By the result above, this implies that decreases with K. Hence, ( ) = 1 B K;1 F ( ) (T 1) increases with K, both because 1 F ( ) increases and because ( ) increases with K for any .
Consider part (iv.b). If T = K, then ( ) = (1 F ( )) K , which decreases with K for any . Hence, ( ) increases with K. By the result above, this implies that increases with K.
Hence, ( ) = (1 F ( )) K decreases with K, both because 1 F ( ) decreases and because
(1 F ( )) K decreases with K for any .
Finally, consider part (iv.c). Consider K 1 and K 2 , K 1 < K 2 , and suppose that > (K 1 ),
where (K 1 ) is given by Proposition 1 when K = K 1 . Since > (K 1 ), both types of equilibria co-exist, and hence the equilibrium characterized by (K 1 ) is shareholder-friendly, which implies ( (K 1 )) > 0:5 and F ( (K 1 )) < 0:5, and the equilibrium characterized by (K 1 )
is management-friendly, which implies (K 1 ) < 0:5 and F (K 1 ) > 0:5. First, consider (K). Note that ( ; K) = g(1 F ( ) ; K), where g(p; K) = P K t= K+1 2 C K t p t (1 p) K t . Since 1 F ( (K 1 )) > 0:5, then, according to the supplementary Lemma 7 in the Online Appendix, g(1 F ( (K 1 )) ; K 2 ) > g(1 F ( (K 1 )) ; K 1 ), and hence ( (K 1 ) ; K 2 ) > ( (K 1 ) ; K 1 ).
Since ( ; K) = 1 ( (1 2 ( ; K))), then ( (K 1 ) ; K 2 ) < ( (K 1 ) ; K 1 ). Therefore, ( (K 1 ) ; K 2 ) (K 1 ) < ( (K 1 ) ; K 1 ) (K 1 ) = 0. Hence, (K 1 ) 2 S (K 2 ), and since (K 2 ) = inf S (K 2 ), then (K 2 ) (K 1 ). Thus, indeed, the most shareholderfriendly equilibrium becomes even more shareholder-friendly as K increases. Next, consider (K). Since 1 F (K 1 ) < 0:5, then, according to Lemma 7, g(1 F (K 1 ) ; K 2 ) < g(1 F (K 1 ) ; K 1 ). Hence, (K 1 ) ; K 2 < (K 1 ) ; K 1 j, and thus (K 1 ) ; K 2 > (K 1 ) ; K 1 . Therefore, (K 1 ) ; K 2 (K 1 ) > (K 1 ) ; K 1 (K 1 ) = 0. Hence, (K 1 ) 2 S (K 2 ), and since (K 2 ) = sup S (K 2 ), then (K 1 ) (K 2 ). Thus, indeed, the least shareholder-friendly equilibrium becomes even less shareholder-friendly as K increases.
Proof of Lemma 4. The …rst statement of the lemma follows from the proof of Proposition 2 (iv.c). That proof shows that if (K) is management-friendly and (K) is shareholderfriendly (which is always the case if both types of equilibria co-exist), then (K) increases and (K) decreases as K increases, and hence both types of equilibria continue to exist.
Consider the second statement, i.e., suppose that (E [ ]) 6 = 0. De…ne
where (K) < 1 is de…ned in Proposition 1 when board size is K, and satis…es ( ; K) = 1 2 . An equilibrium is shareholder-friendly if and only if < . Note that under a simple majority rule, ( ; K) > 1 2 , F ( ) < 1 2 , and hence = F 1 1 2 for all K. In particular, for a symmetric distribution, = E [ ], and hence 1 > 0.
Consider part (iii). In the Online Appendix, we prove that if ( ) 6 = 0, then 2 A, where A = f^ 0 : for any ^ , there exists at least one shareholder-friendly and at least one management-friendly equilibriumg. Thus, if ( ) 6 = 0, both types of equilibria exist for (3) when K = 3. Hence, based on the …rst statement of the lemma, both types of equilibria exist for (3) and any K > 3, as required. Consider part (i). Since ( ; K) 2 (0; 1), then ( ; K) 2 ( 1 ( ) ; 1 ( )) for any and K 3. Since any equilibrium is a solution to ( ; K) = , then any equilibrium satis…es 2 ( 1 ( ) ; 1 ( )). Note that 1 , 6 2 ( 1 ( ) ; 1 ( )). If 1 ( ), then any equilibrium satis…es > , i.e., is management-friendly. Similarly, if 1 ( ), then any equilibrium satis…es < , i.e., is shareholder-friendly, which completes the proof of part (i). Note also that parts (i) and (iii) together imply that 1 < 2 . Finally, part (ii) is proved in the Online Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Using (13) 
Consider Part (i). If ( ) = 1 2 , then it follows directly from the expression of ( ) that ( ) = 0. The case ( ) = 1 requires ! 1. Note that
Since lim ! 1 F ( ) = 0 and lim ! 1 E [ j > ] = E [ ], both the …rst and second terms equal E [ ] and hence cancel out. The third term can be rewritten as
The case ( ) = 0 requires ! 1. Similarly to above,
This concludes part (i). Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from the expression for ( ) and the observation that (1; ) > E [ ] for any > 1.
Proof of Lemma 6. The …rst statement follows from Lemma 5, which implies that shareholders' (management's) expected utility in any shareholder-friendly equilibrium is strictly higher (lower) than in any management-friendly equilibrium. To prove the second statement,
